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Biotechnology and the life sciences promise to revolutionise societies, notably by curing 
terrible diseases, making food healthier and the environment cleaner, all the while 
creating unprecedented prosperity. Fearing to lose much of these benefits to the United 
States, the leaders of the European Union (during the 2000 Lisbon Council) called for a 
transformation of Europe into a leading knowledge economy by 2010. Acknowledging 
the economic potential of their application, the Stockholm Council of 2001 agreed to 
place biotechnology and the life sciences ahead of information technology in developing 
the knowledge economy, and the Commission was asked to prepare a plan accordingly. 
In January 2002, the Commission published a strategy comprising a detailed action plan 
on biotechnology and the life sciences meant to attain the Lisbon objective. In short, the 
European Union has on its agenda for the next few years a transformation that also 
constitutes a sizeable challenge, given the well-known fears biotechnology and the life 
sciences inspire among Europeans. 
I want to suggest in this short article that policy network analysis is particularly useful to 
understand the difficulties facing Europe in transforming itself into an amicable place for 
biotechnology and life sciences. Policy networks structure the interactions among policy 
relevant actors; they create regularity in the process of policy formulation and implement- 
tation and thereby condition policy change. They do so by displaying varying asymmetry 
in the distribution of policy capacity among actors, varying degrees of interconnection 
between public authorities and civil society, varying cohesion around policy ideas, and 
varying openness to new actors (Montpetit, 2002: 6). 
The current structural attributes of European policy networks, I argue, are likely to 
prevent the type of policy change necessary to transform Europe into a leading know- 
ledge economy, however. Although one might object that the solution does not so much 
rest with policy change but with changes in networks themselves, the literature indicates 
that top-down network transformations, commanded by political leaders, are rarely suc- 
cessful.  
Capacity and Interconnection 
Catching up with the United States in the area of biotechnology and life sciences, the 
Commission suggests, requires significant policy change. Not only should policies be 
developed to reassure Europeans, but current policies are complex and send conflicting 
messages to potential investors in life sciences and biotechnology: “The clarification of 
the legislative environment within the EC will provide innovative firms in the various 
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industries using biotechnology with an incentive to continue or even increase their 
investments in research” (Commission of the European Communities, 2002, 11). In order 
to realise this policy change, the Commission writes, capable public administrations are 
necessary: “The fast development of biotechnology and the broad range of applications 
requires a pro-active role for public authorities to monitor the impact on competitiveness 
of the existing policy framework and to anticipate emerging issues and pro-actively adopt 
policies” (Commission of the European Communities, 2002, 11). 
In principle, the Commission is right to count on public authorities to orchestrate this 
industrial policy change. Policy network studies have long ago demonstrated that anticipa 
tory industrial policy changes, as opposed to reactionary policy changes, are most likely 
to occur where state agencies are strong enough to exercise leadership. The development 
of forward-looking policies is most likely, Atkinson and Coleman (1989, 51) argue, 
where decision-making power is concentrated within a single resourceful state agency. 
Uncommon, such a power concentration is often replaced in strong states by task forces 
or coordinating committees capable of encouraging “the independent thinking and broader 
perspective required for long-term policy planning.”  
Unfortunately, such a strong state does not exist at the supranational level in Europe. The 
structure of the Council has encouraged sectoral autonomy to a point rarely seen in 
Member States and the weakness of the Commission as a bureaucracy constitutes a 
serious obstacle to more coordination among autonomous sectors. As Streeck (1992: 105) 
claims: “inter-governmentalism and the veto powers of individual nations were typically 
strong enough to pre-empt or modify centrally made decisions.” Under these cir-
cumstances, the forward looking policy approach observed in the corporatist networks of 
several member states is unlikely to be reproduced at the level of the European Union. 
Unsurprisingly, Peterson (1997: 2) argues, “the character and type of interests which 
benefit from EU governance vary considerably between different policy sectors”, hence 
the policy complexity which worries Commission officials and biotechnology industry 
representatives. To meet the extraordinary challenge of making supranational public 
authorities proactively work to align the divergent sectoral policies of the European 
Union concerning biotechnology and life sciences, the Commission simply proposes to 
strengthen its monitoring capacity (Commission of the European Communities, 2002, 
27). More than ever, I can only concur, “it is important to appreciate how resource-poor 
the Commission is compared to national administrations. This contingency places severe 
limits on its power in EU governance and gives it strong incentives to ‘network’ with EU 
policy stakeholders” (Peterson, 1997, 8). 
In fact, creating close interconnections with stakeholders appears as one of the strategy of 
the Commission to make up for its own weakness. Action ten of the Commission’s 
strategic plan announces the creation of a Competitiveness in Biotechnology Advisory 
Group bringing together the industry and academia to assist public authorities. 
There is a vigorous debate among students of Euro-groups about their capacity to ef-
fectively participate in governance (for a summary of this debate see Greenwood, 1998). 
While some authors argue that most European interest groups are too fragmented along 
national lines to work in partnership with European institutions, Greenwood (1998, 87; 
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2000) contends that an increasing number of groups, including the biotechnology in-
dustry, possess sufficient resources to gather, in a sustainable manner, useful policy-
making expertise. Greenwood, then, would have little doubt about the capacity of Indus-
try to assist the Commission through the Competitiveness in Biotechnology Advisory 
Group.  
However, Greenwood (1998, 102) also insists on the capacity of “a range of interests 
[including public interest groups]… to contribute to highly integrated and institutiona-
lised forms of sectoral governance.” Therefore, nothing guarantees the Directorate-
General for Health and Consumer Protection, for example, will prefer the advice of the 
Competitiveness in Biotechnology Advisory Group over that of consumers or patients 
who are also capable of participating in sectoral governance. As Mazey and Richardson 
(2002, 156) argue, the policy process in the European Union is fragmented to a point 
where groups have several venues over which to choose for policy influence. European 
institutions and interest groups do not interconnect in an institutionalised and steady 
manner, a situation which makes for policies often evolving in unpredictable and even 
opposing directions, despite the best intentions of the Commission. 
Cohesion 
Worries related to the competitiveness of Europe in the area of biotechnology and life 
sciences do not only stem from the complexity of current policies, but also from the 
widespread public fears concerning potential unethical applications. “Without broad 
public acceptance and support the development and use of life sciences and 
biotechnology in Europe will be contentious, benefits will be delayed and 
competitiveness will be likely to suffer” (Commission of the European Communities, 
2002: 12). Genetic engineering in the agro-food sector has notably suffered from a very 
low acceptance rate among Europeans and some view the integration of the more popular 
biomedical applications within the Commission’s strategic plan as a wise approach to 
avoid blanket opposition. More fundamentally, however, the Commission proposes to 
reassure Europeans by creating an “inclusive, comprehensive, well informed and 
structured” societal dialogue to ensure life sciences and biotechnological applications are 
consistent with broadly accepted goals (Commission of the European Communities, 
2002: 11-12). 
The Commission assumes that the circle of participants in policy-making in the area of 
life sciences and biotechnology has been too narrow in the past, excluding a number of 
actors who represent important segments of civil society, and leading public suspicion 
toward the policies of the Union. Networks dealing with biotechnology were closed 
around a small number of experts sharing a common scientific paradigm and a language 
not easily accessible to lay citizens. The Commission’s White Paper on Governance has 
already paved the way to such a criticism of existing policy networks in the area of 
biotechnology. Food crises, the Commission writes in the White Paper, “undermined 
public confidence in expert-based policy-making. Public perceptions are not helped by 
the opacity of the Union’s system of expert committees or the lack of information about 
how they work. It is often unclear who is actually deciding – experts or those with 
political authority”. Consequently, the Commission calls for opening expert networks to 
© Éric Montpetit – Biotechnology, Life Sciences and Policy Networks in the European Union 3
“a wide range of disciplines and experience beyond the purely scientific” (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2001: 19). 
In addition to curbing public suspicions, opening networks to wider participation, the 
Commission argues, makes for better public policy. As stated in the White Paper, “The 
quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on ensuring wide participation 
throughout the policy chain—from conception to implementation” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2001: 10). As Abels argues (2002, 15), however, it is far from 
clear that open networks formulate better public policies. 
While a recent literature on deliberative practices suggests wide-open participation 
produces more acceptable policies (see Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe, 2001), years of 
policy network studies suggest some caveats to this conclusion. While several authors 
present examples of closed policy networks producing efficient policies and even 
generating trust (see Öberg, 2002; Detlef, 1998), I cannot think of a single study stressing 
the efficiency of wide-open policy networks. Why? Because openness risks to undermine 
the cohesion minimally required for negotiations, deliberations or dialogues among actors 
(Risse, 2000). 
An open network enables whoever desires entering or exiting to do so. As actors 
constantly move in and out, shared experiences become scarce and trust difficult to build 
(Öberg, 2002). When actors cannot trust each other, their willingness to make con-
cessions diminishes; they view rigidly holding their initial ideas as the best way to protect 
themselves against potentially ill-intended actors. Moreover, the movement of actors 
inward increases the spread of values, beliefs and ideas potentially translatable into policy 
designs. As Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999: 125) argue, when the spread of ideas is so 
wide as to divide actors at the level of core “beliefs,” any rapprochement through learning 
becomes difficult. In other words, in open network environments politicians cannot count 
on consensus to make decisions. Rather, open networks present a long and unstable menu 
of alternatives to politicians who can only decide by arbitration. Arbitration may not 
make for worse policies than consensus, but to those finding themselves on the loosing 
side, arbitration should not inspire trust in the quality of policies. As Scharpf (1999) 
argues, it does not suffice to listen to more actors to create a sense of input-oriented 
legitimacy; actors must also be heard. 
Of course, for debates, fruitful deliberations and eventually policy innovations, some 
diversity in network actors’ ideas is required. But if the purpose of greater network 
openness is to eliminate exclusion, such as appear to be the intention of the European 
Commission, diversity risks endangering the cohesion often associated with effective 
networks. The European White Paper on Governance suggests: “consultation helps the 
Commission and the other Institutions to arbitrate between competing claims and 
priorities” (Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 15). The European 
Commission might indeed need help if networks are open to the desired extent because 
controversial arbitrations will become increasingly common. 
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Openness 
Beyond the rapid establishment of a linkage between network openness and good public 
policies, the Commission’s analysis rests on the assumption that those at the top of 
European institutions can simply decide to open policy networks. It is as if policy net-
works can easily be manipulated and changed at will. However, policy network studies 
would suggest this assumption is wrong. 
Agricultural policy networks have served as notorious examples of closed policy 
networks facing pressure to open up, particularly in Europe. Typical of these studies is 
the conclusion that closed policy networks are well equipped to mediate the nature of the 
changes pressed from outside, notably by politicians (Marsh and Smith, 2000: 8). The 
actors of these networks have over the years become primary sources of information and 
they have provided crucial resources for effective policy implementation. Therefore, to 
avoid any major disturbances in the management of public affairs, their participation in 
policy formulation can only be diluted with extreme caution. In fact, opening is most 
easily achieved when the actors inside the networks realize that they should allow new 
actors to enter. This type of predisposition, however, develops only over the long run 
through negotiations, exchanges of ideas and learning. What is more, learning cannot be 
commanded and controlled; politicians cannot demand network actors to learn, nor 
choose the lessons in their place. In short, actors inside closed policy networks can come 
to accept an opening of their network, but it may not be to the extent or to the actors 
politicians wish to grant a greater policy-making role. In other words, European leaders 
may loudly demand the opening of the networks dealing with biotechnology and life 
sciences, but it is far from certain that they will obtain the opening that they expect. 
Nevertheless, the emergence of biotechnology and life sciences to prominence on the 
European Union's agenda is likely to trigger profound network changes. Marsh and Smith 
(2000: 8) argue that networks can radically change when the emergence of a new issue 
engenders a network clash. When problems of agricultural pollution reached the agenda 
of governments in Denmark and Sweden, Daugbjerg (1998) shows, it produced a clash 
between environmental and agricultural policy networks. Over time, in both countries, 
the networks reconfigured themselves, but in different ways, thereby generating the 
divergence between Danish and Swedish agro-environmental policies. A similar process 
involving network clashes and reconfigurations is likely to occur in the European Union 
because of increased interest in biotechnology and life sciences. The health policy 
network, the agricultural policy network, the industrial policy network, the environmental 
policy network, the consumer policy network, among others, all embody different, if not 
conflicting, values, beliefs and ideas relevant to biotechnology and life sciences policies. 
As the European Union engages in the development of these new areas, clashes between 
these policy networks appear unavoidable. Over time, a mixture of strategic action and 
communicative action will likely make ideas, alliances and patterns of interaction evolve 
slowly giving rise to new networks. Such a reconfiguration will also likely create new 
exclusions. 
Evidence of a clash and the beginning of a reconfiguration of networks following the 
emergence of biotechnology and life sciences issues already exist in the European Union. 
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The main policy network relevant to biotechnology and life sciences at the end of the 
1980s established close interconnections between researchers, industry and the relevant 
Directorates-General of the Commission during the development of Framework Programmes 
for Research, Technology and Development. The cooperation of these actors was mostly 
motivated by the improvement of the competitiveness of European industry and largely 
neglected ethical and social concerns related to biotechnology and the life sciences 
(Abels, 2002, 4). These latter preoccupations, however, were not left entirely unattended 
as a more marginal network, at the centre of which was the European Parliament, had 
began addressing them. According to Abels (2002, 4), the first significant clash between 
these two networks occurred in 1988 when the Commission presented the Human 
Genome Analysis Programme. The neglect of ethical issues was loudly denounced by the 
Parliament, helping to sensitize political leaders in Europe to the importance of these 
issues. Ever since, several groups, committees and institutions concerned with the ethics 
of biomedicine have gained importance, even within the Commission, which created in 
1991 the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies. As indicated in its 
strategic plan on biotechnology and life sciences, the Commission expects networking 
with ethics bodies to increase in the near future (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2002, 14). However, whether policy networks have been deeply reconfi-
gured, pushing industry-focused groups and agencies to the periphery and ethics bodies 
closer to the centre, remains doubtful. Indicating the continued prominence of industry-
focused groups, Abels (2002) rightfully suspects the Commission of using “ethics” in an 
instrumental manner, that is in a strategy to encourage the fast development of life 
sciences and biotechnological applications, if not to regain some lost ground to the 
European Parliament. 
As the above example makes clear, network changes resulting from clashes are not 
necessarily the equivalent of network-opening. In contrast to the 1980s, when a single 
network, albeit marginal, was concerned with the ethics of biomedicine, the clash en-
couraged the industry-focused network to also include actors identified with a discourse 
on ethics. However, the actors included are those also capable of recognising the 
economic value of biotechnology and life sciences. Actors viewing biotechnology and 
biomedicine as an unnecessary, if not a dangerous development, keep forming, at best, a 
marginal network. In other words, the reconfiguration triggered by the clash of networks 
concerned with life sciences and biotechnology in the European Union is unlikely to 
conform to the desire of European leaders to create a “comprehensive and inclusive” 
dialogue. The policy network literature makes it clear: networks cannot be manipulated in 
such a way. 
Conclusion 
Networks, Weiss (1998) convincingly argues, do not always resist change but sometimes 
accomplish successful industrial policy transformations. This is so where public agencies 
possess sufficient capacity to mobilize strong interest groups behind a cohesive set of 
objectives. Unfortunately, few European policy networks possess these characteristics. 
Therefore, the European Union’s strategic plan for biotechnology and life sciences 
overestimates the capacity of Community Institutions to mobilise the biotechnology in-
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dustry, ethics bodies and groups representing concerned citizens behind the transfor-
mation of Europe into a leading knowledge economy. At least, this is what policy net-
work studies would suggest. 
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